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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Scope of Appeal 
In their Notice of Appeal, Defendants-Appellants Caravellas set forth as their initial issue 
on appeal whether the District Court erred in failing to find that Respondents-Counterdefendants 
Frontier Development Group, LLC (FDG) & Michael Horn (Horn) were liable to Appellants for 
fraud. (Tr. Vol. Il, p. 391). 
Plaintiffs-Respondents FDG/Horn contend that the court properly concluded that the 
scienter element of fraud was not present, that FDG was not an alter ego of Horn, and that Horn 
was not personally liable to the CaravelJas. They further contend that the Caravellas did not 
meet their burden of proof as to the other elements of fraud as the district court analyzed each 
element under the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard, rather than the "clear and 
convincing" standard necessary to prove fraud. 
Caravellas attempt to narrow the appeal and claim that Respondent-Plaintiffs cannot 
challenge the district court's finding on eight of the nine elements of fraud because they did not 
file a cross-appeal. (Appellants' hrief, p. 18, fn. 4). There is no legal support for such a narrow 
interpretation of the Idaho Appellate Rules or Idaho caselaw. 
Idaho Appellate Rule II(g) instructs that after an appeaJ has heen filed and no affirmative 
relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation, or modification of the judgment, order, or decree, 
an issue may be presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) 
without filing a cross-appeal. See Walker v. Shoshone Cnty., 1] 2 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290, 
292 (1987) (A cross-appeal is required only when the respondent seeks to change or add to the 
relief afforded below, but not when it merely seeks to sustain a judgment for reasons presented at 
trial which were not relied upon by the trial judge but should have been.) The issue on appeal is 
whether the district court properly found that Plaintiffs were not liable for fraud, and FDG/Horn 
should be allowed to argue every element regarding the district court's finding regarding the 
fraud claim. 
b. Statement of the Facts 
FDG was organized on September 20, 2005, with Horn as managing partner, in the state 
of Wyoming. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 90; Findings #2).1 FOG is a registered foreign limited liability 
corporation in the state of Idaho. (hi.) FOG is also registered in Idaho as a dba entity Open 
Range Homes. FOG is registered as a residential contractor in Idaho. (Id.) 
In 2006, Richard Myers (hereafter "Myers") purchased the property at issue, subject to a 
deed of trust in favor of First Horizon Home Loans (hereafter "First Horizon"). (Findings #6). 
FOG was contracted hy Myers to build a residential home on July of 2006, and construction 
began at the end of the summer. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit . Findings #6). This was going to he FOG's 
third construction project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 375,11. 6-12). Myers had qualified for and ohtained a 
construction loan in an amount which was less than the original estimates FOG provided to 
complete the project as per Myers' original plans. To reduce construction costs, Myers requested 
several modifications and deviated from the original construction plans. (Findings #7). 
In early 2007 Myers suffered a severe financial setback and was having difficulty making 
interest payments on the construction loan to First Horizon. (Findings #7). FDG coordinated 
I The district court's Findings and Conclusions are found at R Vol. II, pp. 3]6-362. 
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with Myers and First Horizon to make interest payments by donating FDG's contracting fee to 
these payments and was foregoing any profit in order to keep the construction progressing on 
Myers' property. Myers also directed FDG to further reduce numerous construction line items 
and transfer the funds to other areas of the Project, allowing Myers to access funds for purposes 
of paying interest on the construction loan. These modifications were approved by First 
Horizon. (Defendants' Exhibit HHHH). Myers did not testify in this case. 
Horn testified at trial that changes to the plans included the siding, stone, windows, 
interior floor plan, and a significant change to the rear elevation in regard to the roof structure. 
(Tr. Vol. T, p. 243-44). For each draw request on the construction loan, Myers would review the 
draw, approve, and sign it. A First Horizon representative would then physically inspect the 
property to verify that materials were present and construction work was completed before 
construction funds were released. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 391, IJ. 17-23; Tr. Vol. II, p. 946, 1. 22 p.947, 
l. 4; p. 962, II. 13-20). There were no findings as to the amount of the funds that were dispersed 
to FDG which were allocated from one line item to another. There was also no finding as to the 
amount allocated to FDG which actually went to pay the interest on the construction loan. 
In April of 2007, Myers declared bankruptcy and First Horizon rescinded the 
construction loan. (Findings #8). Myers and First Horizon instructed FDG to immediately 
vacate the property and halt all expenditures. All of the building materials that had been 
delivered but not yet installed were left on the property when construction was halted. There 
was no finding whether Myers, First Horizon, or any of the subcontractors reclaimed and/or sold 
these items after construction was halted. There was testimony at trial that another contractor 
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worked on the property to get the house to a saleable stage. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 246, 1. 8 p. 247, 1. 
16). Neither Myers nor First Horizon has ever alleged that FDG, or Horn personally, was ever 
fraudulent in their dealings. 
The project was approximately 50% completed when construction was halted. (Findings 
#8). Two foundation inspections by the Teton County Building Officials had been completed on 
the property. The property passed both inspections, and it was determined that the property was 
structurally sound. (ld.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). Nothing else on the house had been completed to 
which an inspection could be performed. (ld.) The interior and structural framing was 
incomplete, the roof was not finished and the doors and windows were left exposed for 14 
months, which included two Teton County winters where the project filled with water, ice, and 
snow. (Findings #8). 
First Horizon initiated foreclosure proceedings on the property, and the property was 
listed as a short sale. (Findings #9). Kathleen Horn, the wife of Michael Horn, was hired by 
Myers as the listing agent with Windermere Real Estate in Driggs, Idaho. (Id.) In March of 
2008, Louis Caravella contacted Mark Griese (hereinafter "Griese") in the Windermere office 
inquiring about properties in Teton County. Kathleen Horn never had contact with Dr. or Mrs. 
Caravella (Caravellas). 
Dr. Caravella is an ophthalmologist who owns his own practice. At all times pertinent to 
this litigation he was living in Ohio. He also has an extensive background in the professional 
world of real estate. He has had a wide range of experience in managing construction projects 
and the district court found him to be a sophisticated purchaser. (Findings #47). As such, he has 
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significant knowledge and experience working with builders and contractors on construction 
management issues. (ld.) 
Dr. Caravella stated that when he built his first office, he worked directly with the 
architect and designed the office to his precise needs. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 45, 1. 6-16). 
Five years later he built his first office building. (Id., Ii. 17-25). On that project, he worked 
extensively with the architect to the point of picking out every singJe detail. (ld.) Dr. Caravella 
then put out bids for services, awarded bids, and built the office. (ld., p. 46). While the project 
was being built, Dr. CaraveJJa went to the site every day to check on the progress and to make 
sure the builders were doing what he wanted them to do. (ld.) Dr. Caravella was also intimately 
involved with the purchase and remodel of four other office buildings with additions to two of 
the buildings. (ld., p. 47-48). 
Dr. Caravella was also extensively involved in building his first house in Cleveland, Ohio 
from the ground up. He put major additions on another home, a summer home, and two vacation 
homes. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 218, ll. 10-25; Defendants' Exhibit J). He also oversaw a 250 
bed addition to a hospital as the hospital administrator, as well as the addition of a separate 
medical building. (ld.) Dr. Caravella indicated that he understood all aspects of the construction 
process. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 46, 1. 25 - p. 47, I. 3). 
In March of 2008, after inquiring about the Myers' property, Griese gave Horn's contact 
information to Dr. Caravella, and he contacted Horn regarding properties in the Teton County 
area. (Findings #26-27). Horn informed him about several properties through an exchange of 
emails. Dr. Caravella was particularly interested in the Myers' property and Griese obtained 
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incomplete drawings from the drafter of the architectural plans, Guy Robertson. (Defendants' 
Exhibit A; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 21, 1. 3-10). Through email, Horn informed Dr. Caravella 
that the property had formerly been owned by a 26 year old from California and when the house 
was about 50% complete, he filed bankruptcy and the funds were cut for the construction. 
(Defendants' Exhibit A). He further stated that between $750,000 and $1,000,000 would be 
required to finish the project. (ld.) 
The next day, after several emails back and forth, Horn sent Griese and Dr. Caravella an 
email with more information on the Myers' property which included the following: 
1 operate on a cost plus contract of 15% and I do not build on a 
fixed price. Once the owner is firm on hiring Open Range, I 
require a $25K deposit which is held in my account until the final 
draw. At the time of the final draw, all final bills are paid off 
including any due contract fee and any remainder paid back to the 
Owner. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). 
On April 14, 2008, Caravellas submitted a cash offer of $749,000.00 on the Myers' 
property prior to visiting the site. (findings #34; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 
25, 11. 8-10). Myers (through Kathleen Horn) counteroffered for $799,000.00, which was 
accepted. (Findings #35). The purchase and sale contract specifically states that the purchase 
was a partially constructed, incomplete structure and that they were purchasing the property "as 
is." (Plaintiff's Exhibits #3, 4,5). 
After Caravellas accepted the counteroffer, Horn recorded a mechanics lien for $23,000 
against the property on behalf of FDG. (Findings #36). This lien was for work that was done 
prior to the Myers' project being halted and for some clean up and temporary railings on the 
6 
stairs so that potential buyers could safely walk through the partially constructed house. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 977, 11. 2-12). Both Myers and First Horizon authorized the work, and did not contest 
this lien. The pending lien was disclosed to Dr. Caravella on March 21, over one month before 
Caravellas closed on the property. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). The lien amount was paid by the 
seller. 
A provision in the Purchase and Sale Agreement stated that Caravella had the right to 
inspect the property and/or had the right to back out of the Agreement at any time for any reason 
prior to May lO. (Plaintiff's Exhibit #3). Caravellas indicated in the contract that they would 
inspect the property. (ld.) In April of 2008, the Caravellas traveled to Idaho and met with 
Greise. (Findings #38) They also met with Horn and visited the Myers' property, Horn's 
personal residence, and another residence (Dr. Burke's). These were all FDG construction 
projects. 
When asked about the quality of workmanship on the different properties, Dr. Caravella 
stated, "I cannot tell quality unless I start lifting up boards and stuff like that." (ld., p. 49-50), 
Dr. Caravella spent over four (4) hours the first day and almost an entire second day at the 
Myers' property for inspection. (Findings #39; Tr. Vol. I, p. 24,1. lO p. 25,1. 2). Dr. Caravella 
testified that he relied on his own expertise in performing this inspection. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, 
p. 40, 11. 2-5). The project was not completely framed at that time and there was nothing 
impeding him from seeing the quality of the work that had been performed up to that point. 
At the time Caravellas visited Teton County, they had not hired Horn to do any work, 
they had not discussed FDG/Horn doing any work for them, nor was Horn paid to inspect the 
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property. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 97, p. 69,11. 4-5; p. 71, ll. 17-18). Horn was not a party to the 
purchase of the Myers' property and had zero financial interest in the transaction. Dr. Caravella 
understood that he had the option to hire an expert to inspect the project structurally or 
otherwise. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 34,1. 1; p. 62, ll. 6-21). When asked why he did not hire a 
professional inspector look at the property for him, Dr. Caravella stated that he was in a little bit 
of a time crunch but could have worked through that. (Id., p. 199,11. 5-21). 
Dr. Caravella contacted Horn on April 23, 2008 and informed him that he was going to 
be the owner of the Myers' property. (Defendants' Exhibit J; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18). He offered 
Horn the job of finishing the house if he wanted it. (Id.) The parties agreed to a cost plus 
arrangement with a 12% fee for Horn's services as a general manager. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16; 
Defendants' Exhibit J). Dr. Caravella instructed that however Horn wanted to phase the project 
was fine with him, however, he wanted to have the entire exterior finished before the next snow 
fall. (Defendants' Exhibit L). Horn's understanding was that he was to proceed with the project 
with the goa] of finishing the entire exterior to protect the house from the winter weather. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 287, ll. 8-23). 
II. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b )(5), 40, and 4] (a), Plaintiffs-Respondents 
contend that they are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. I.A.R. 
40 provides that costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party. 
These contentions are supported by Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), 12-121 and This action 
arose from a commercial transaction and contract for services and l.A.R. 41 requires a party 
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seeking attorney fees on appeal to assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first 
appellate brief. 
I.e. § 12-120(3) allows for attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. The 
Caravellas hired FDG/Horn in a "commercial transaction" to provide construction materials and 
services. The underlying action arose out of this commercial transaction. Plaintiff Horn filed 
suit against CaraveIlas in an attempt to recover on this transaction and the issues on this appeal 
arise from the transaction. See Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 911, 104 P.3d 946, 
953 (2004) (Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced 
by I.e. § 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute, and on appeal the 
prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established.) I.e. 
§ 1 120(3) has been interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court to mandate the award of attorney 
fees on appeal as well as at trial pursuant to I.e. § 12-]20(3). Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 137 
Idaho 703, 712, 52 P.3d 848, 857 (2002). 
I.e. § 1 121 aIlows for attorney fees to be awarded to Respondents FDG/Horn in this 
action. This statute allows for attorney fees in a civil action to a prevailing party when the 
appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on 
conflicting evidence. Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408, 34 P.3d 1085, 1091 (2001). In 
Anderson, attorney fees were awarded because the Appellants asked the Court to reweigh and 
reevaluate the evidence, to second-guess the trail court's findings which were based on 
conflicting evidence, and to ani ve at a different conclusion than the district court by reassessing 
the credibility of the various witnesses. Further, the Appellants did not present any reasonable 
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legal argument demonstrating that the district court erred, on the facts presented, In its 
conclusion. (Id.) 
This appeal brought by the Caravellas is similar in nature and substance to the appeal in 
Anderson. In this appeal, the Caravellas are asking the Court to reweigh the evidence and arrive 
at a different conclusion than the district court. Further, Caravellas have not presented any legal 
argument that the district court erred on the facts presented. In fact, Caravellas are aware that 
the district court analyzed the fraud claim under the lower "preponderance of evidence" standard 
of evidence. (Appellate brief, p. 16). Despite the fact that the district court held that the 
elements were not present under the lower standard, Caravellas are asking this Court to reweigh 
the evidence and find the elements of fraud present under the higher clear and convincing 
standard of evidence. Respondents FDG/Horn are entitled to attorney fees in this appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The party alleging intentional misrepresentation or fraud has the burden of proving the 
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Lindherg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 225,46 
P.3d 518, 521 (2002). If the district judge's findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, the appellate court will not disturb those findings. Id. The Supreme Court 
exercises free review over the district judge's conclusions of law. Id. 
The trial court's determination that a claim has not been proven is entitled to great weight 
on appeal. Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho at 706, 8 P.3d at 1249 (2000). This Court's review of 
a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of 
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fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Id. The Supreme Court 
may not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, unless 
the challenged finding is not supported by substantial, competent evidence. [d., 134 Idaho 702, 
707,8 P.3d 1245, 1250. 
The substantial evidence standard for appellate reVIew reqUIres a greater quantum of 
evidence in cases where the trial court's finding must be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, than in cases where mere preponderance is required. [d. When reviewing the trial 
court's findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to sustain the finding. !d. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT FRAUD WAS NOT 
PRESENT. 
Fraud must be pled with particularity. That is, the alleging party must specify what 
factual circumstances constituted the fraud. LR.C.P. 9(b); Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 
833, 172 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2007). A party must establish nine elements to prove fraud: 1) a 
statement or a representation of fact; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity; 5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; 6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity 
of the statement; 7) reliance by the hearer; 8) justifiable reliance; and 9) resultant injury. (ld.) 
The district court, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, found that the 
Caravellas established the presence of eight out of nine elements of fraud set forth in Glaze, but 
could not establish by a preponderance of evidence that Horn and/or Norman knew their 
statements were false. (Conclusions #43). Although the district court ultimately came to the 
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correct result, it did not find that the other eight elements of fraud were present by a clear and 
convincing standard. 
A preponderance of the evidence is such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to 
it, has more convincing force and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies 
therein. Cook v. W. Field Seeds, Inc., 91 Idaho 675, 681, 429 P.2d 407, 413 (1967). A clear and 
convincing standard is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved 
is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 141 P.3d 1057 
(2006) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed.1999). Under the correct standard of 
clear and convincing, this Court should affirm the district court's holding that fraud is not 
present. 
a. Horn's Statements regarding the Value, Condition, Quality and 
Workmanship of the Horne Prior to Purchase were not fraudulent. 
The district court found that the Caravellas had established the presence of eight out of 
nine elements of fraud hy a preponderance of the evidence, but was unable to conclude that 
Caravellas estahlished that Horn knew his statements were false. (Conclusions #43). 
The district court erred in its Conclusions by using a lower standard than required to 
prove the elements of fraud. Nevertheless, the district court could not find Horn liable for fraud. 
Under the correct evidentiary standard, the court likely would not have found that any of these 
eight elements were satisfied. Since this Court reviews issues of law de novo, it reviews whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence of each element to a clear and convincing standard. 
Id. 
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i. Value of the Home 
Caravellas entire claim relies on their argument that Horn deceived them and 
misrepresented the subject property from the very beginning of their discussions. Horn had no 
purpose to deceive them. Horn had no financial stake in the property and, at most, he was 
discussing the property with a potential buyer, who may possihly hire FDG to finish the property 
sometime in the future. 
The district court found that Horn told the Caravellas that the subject property had been 
sitting untouched for over a year; that First Horizon would not allow the property to be sold for 
less than $800,000, and that other prospective buyers had tried unsuccessfully to purchase it for 
less. (Findings # 27). The district court also found that Horn represented to Caravellas that the 
value of the property was $1.2 million, with $800,000 worth of construction completed and the 
lot having a value of $400,000. (Findings # 28). Caravellas argue that Horn misrepresented the 
value of the property. Lacking from their argument is any evidence of the actual value of the 
property. Caravella have inferred that the value of the property is equal to the cost of the 
materials expended on the project, plus the value of the lot. However, there is no clear and 
convincing evidence to support a finding of the actual value, misrepresentation of the actual 
value of the subject property, or the difference alleged from Horn's estimates. Horn had no 
relationship with Carvellas at that time. 
Caravellas claim that it is impossible for Horn not to have known that the items of work 
he certified as complete to Myers and First Horizon were never in fact incorporated into the 
project's construction, and thus the amount used in the project was less than what FDG was paid. 
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(Appellants' brief, p. 19). Caravellas further claim that Horn "misrepresented" to them 
numerous times that $800,000 worth of construction had been completed which is nearly one and 
one-half (lYz) limes the amount he knew had actually been completed. 2 (ld.) 
The district court did not reach a conclusion that these were representations of fact (first 
element of fraud) regarding the value of the property by a clear and convincing standard. These 
representations were Horn's opinion regarding an incomplete project FDG had worked on 14 
months prior. When Caravella first inquired about the property, Horn stated: 
The River Rim house waslis owned by a 26 year old kid from California 
who was given a zero down payment loan by the bank. He hired me to 
build the house after he had gone through design with a local draftsman. 
About 50% complete, the kid filed personal bankruptcy and the bank cut-
off the construction funds. The house has sat in the current state for 
about I-year. The bank won't accept anything less than $800K, many 
have tried and all have been rejected. With the $400K lot included, 
approximately $1.2M was expended on the project. Given the potential 
$800K purchase price, the $400K lot is free so to speak. We need 
between $750K and $lM to finish the project to high-end standards 
similar to my Teton Springs house. If you're looking for a second or 
primary home, the house is a very good deal if you like River Rim 
Ranch. But if it is for speclflip purposes, I would not recommend a spec 
house anywhere right now. 
(Defendants' Exhibit A). These financial representations and values are actually fairly 
meaningless in the context of Horn's representations to Caravella. The general representations 
were gi ven to Caravella more than a month and a half prior to any agreement between Caravella 
Caravella also claims that Horn had a personal financial interest in the sale because his wife was the selling real 
estate agent and that Horn intended to record his untimely, unfounded lien for $2.3,000 which was paid out of the 
closing funds. These claims carry little evidentiary weight; throughout the email conversations between Horn and 
Caravella, they discussed numerous properties that Horn owned where Horn had an actual financial interest. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 10). There is absolutely zero evidence that Horn had any financial interest through his wife's 
representation of Myers. Further, Horn had disclosed the lien to Caravella during these initial email conversations. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16). 
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and Horn to finish the Myers' property. Horn had not reviewed the documentation for the 
expenditures on the project prior to his emails with Caravella, as he no longer had any of the 
documents. (Findings #23). 
The district court did not find by a clear and convincing standard that this representation 
was false (second element of fraud). This representation accurately depicts the project as 50% 
complete. (Findings #8) The total expected build cost for the Project was $1,248,000.00. 
(Defendant Exhibit HHHH). Therefore, if the actual amount of expenditures on the project 
(minus the cost of the lot) was $570,000, as claimed by Caravella, Horn accurately represented 
that the home was 50% complete. Horn also accurately depicted that the bank would not accept 
anything less than $800,000. There had been several offers under $800,000 on the property, 
including Caravella's first offer, which were declined. Lastly, Horn described the amount he 
bel ieved was required to finish the project at up to $1,000,000. 
Further, Caravellas provided nothing for the record regarding an assessed value of the 
home by an expert who is qualified to make such an assessment. Horn was a building contractor, 
not a real estate agent. Horn had some knowledge as to the amount expended on the project and 
the value at that time FDG was on the project, but Horn was not qualified to assess the value of 
the property at the time Caravellas purchased the property, and the district court was no finding 
as to the actual value of the property. 
The district court did not find by a clear and convincing standard that this representation 
was material (third element of fraud). The district court generally found that the Caravellas 
relied on Horn's representations regarding the home in order to prepare an offer to purchase the 
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property from Myers. (Findings #33). There was no finding that the Caravellas relied on 
representations after they personally inspected the property, and there is no evidence to support 
such an assertion. 
Dr. Caravella, as a knowledgeable buyer, personally inspected the property. The fact that 
he knew there were other offers on the property superseded any representation made by Horn. 
On April ]4, 2008, Caravellas submitted a cash offer of $749,000.00 on the project property 
prior to visiting the site. (Findings #34; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 25, ll. 8-
10). Caravellas specifically included a provision in the purchase agreement that they had the 
right to inspect the property and/or had the right to back out of the Agreement at any time for any 
reason prior to May 10. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10). Dr. Caravella then chose to personally inspect 
the property for two consecutive days, even though he understood that he could have hired an 
expert to inspect the project, structurally or otherwise. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 97, p. 34, 1. 1; p. 62, 
11. 6-21). He testified that he relied on his own expertise in performing this inspection. (Id., p. 
40, II. 2-5). At the time of the inspection, Caravellas had not decided to purchase the property, 
nor had they hired Horn to inspect the property or finish the construction (Id., p. 71, 11. I 18). 
There is no clear and convincing evidence that any representations by Horn were material, 
because Dr. Caravella made his own assessment of the property when he inspected it. 
Further, there is no evidence on record that Caravellas would not have purchased the 
property for the same price, absent any statements of value from Horn. Dr. Caravella was aware 
that there were other offers on the property and that First Horizon would not accept any offer 
below $799,000. Caravellas presented no evidence that they would have rescinded their offer 
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absent Horn's representation of the value of the property, or that they could have purchased the 
property at a lower price. 
The district court did not find, even by the lower preponderance of the evidence standard, 
that Horn intentionally misrepresented (fourth element of fraud) any issue of fact to Caravellas. 
(Conclusion #43). There was no evidence of when Horn last reviewed the documentation in 
order to find that he could have intentionally misrepresented the value of the property. There 
was no evidence that Horn indicated to Dr. Caravella that an inspection or appraisal was not 
necessary. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 264, II. 15-24). These were general representations of his opinion on 
which a fraud claim cannot be predicated. lordan v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899,907,865 P.2d 990, 
998 (Ct. App. 1993). Caravellas' claim is pure speculation that Horn's estimate of the 
expenditures into the project equate to the actual value of the property, or that Horn was 
intentionally misrepresenting anything in regard to the project. 
The district court did not find by a clear and convincing standard that Horn's intent was 
that there be reliance (fifth element of fraud). Horn had not been hired by Caravellas when he 
gave Dr. Caravella his opinion regarding the property. Dr. Caravella had not even made up his 
mind to hire Horn at this time. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 97, p. 69,11. 4-5; p. 71, II. 17-18). 
The district court did not find by a clear and convincing standard that the Caravellas were 
ignorant of the falsity of the representation (sixth element) of value or that they actually relied 
(seventh element of fraud) on such representations. Caravella is attempting to represent to this 
Court that a sophisticated buyer such as himself, who personally spent two days inspecting the 
property, disregarded his own due diligence of assessing documents of the previous construction 
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contract (such as First Horizon's draw sheet) and relied solely on this representation by Horn as 
to the value of a property that had been sitting dormant for 14 months for a cash purchase of 
$799,000.00. 
Dr. Caravella relied on his own inspection of the property and was satisfied that another 
inspection was unnecessary because of his substantial background and experience. The district 
court found that Caravellas relied on Horn's representations when they made the revocable offer; 
Caravellas decided to purchase the property only after Dr. Caravella's own inspection. 
The district court did not find by a clear and convincing standard that the Caravellas 
justifiably relied (eighth element of fraud) on the representation. In fact, the district court's 
findings are contrary. The district court found that Caravellas relied on Horn's representations to 
put in an offer on the property. (Findings #33). This offer was revocable, and the Caravellas 
could rescind the contract for any reason prior to May 10. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). Dr. Caravella 
subsequently inspected the property two consecutive days, finding several construction issues, 
and then proceeded with the purchase the property. 
When a purchaser is given the opportunity to conduct an independent investigation and 
does so, it is generally held that he is not entitled to rely on alleged misrepresentations of the 
seller. 3 Snow's Auto Supply, Inc., v. Donnaier, 108 Idaho 73, 78, 696 P.2d 924, 929 (Ct. App. 
1985); Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 360, 218 P.2d 345, 349 (1950) (A party is not entitled to 
relief on the ground of false representations where he does not rely upon them but relies on his 
3 It is important that there was no privity between these parties. Caravella had no right to rely on Horn for any 
representation at that point. These representations do not later merge into the agreement when Caravella hired 
FDG/Horn to perform subsequent work. If Caravella would have hired someone else to complete the construction 
there would he no merit to a claim for these representations, and the Court should find no right to rely in this 
situation. 
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own judgment or investigations or his own examination of the property involved); Walker v. 
Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 490-91, 373 P.2d 559, 562 (1962) (Where a party relies upon his 
own investigation or judgment as to the value of property, he is not entitled to relief upon the 
ground of false representations).4 
At the time of the initial discussions with Horn, Caravellas had not hired FDG/Horn to 
inspect the property, assess the value, or finish the construction on the project. Horn was not a 
party to the purchase agreement. At best, Horn was hoping to represent his ability in a way so 
that he would be hired in the future by Caravellas to build a home, or finish the construction on 
the Myers' project. A sophisticated purchaser such as Dr. Caravella cannot claim that he 
justifiably relied on a representation by a person that had zero interest in the alleged 
representation and is not in the business of assessing the value of real estate in the first place. 
The district court also did not find by a clear and convincing standard that the 
Caravellas were injured (ninth clement of fraud) by Horn's estimate of value. Dr. Caravella was 
aware of other bidders on the property. In fact, there was a backup offer for the same price that 
Caravellas had agreed to. Further, Caravellas was aware that First Horizon would not accept any 
offer below $800,000.5 (Findings #27) There is no evidence on record that Caravellas would not 
have purchased the property for the same price regardless of whether Horn made any statements 
4 Caravellas may claim that the representations were fraudulent because of a failure to disclose latent defects. 
However, there were no latent defects in the construction when the Caravellas purchased the property. Latent 
defects are those that are not discoverable by a reasonable inspection. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin. 113 Idaho 37, 50, 
740 P.2d 1022, 1035 (1987). Every alleged defect in construction when the property was purchased by Caravellas 
was found when Jared Kay was hired to inspect the property. These defects were those that would have been found 
by any proper inspection at the time of purchase; none of the defects were latent. 
5 It would be purely semantics to argue that the bank accepted $799,000.00 and, therefore. accepted less than 
$800,000.00. 
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to him regarding the value of the property and therefore, there is no evidence of injury. 
ii. Condition & Quality of the Home, and Workmanship of 
Construction. 
The district court found that Horn advised the Caravellas that certain structural, framing 
and leaking issues needed to be remedied as soon as possible. Mrs. Caravella testified that while 
she had concerns about the watcr intrusion into the house, Horn minimized the problems and told 
the Caravellas the home was "in good shape," "structurally sound" and a "great housc." 
(Findings #42). The district court erred in concluding that Caravellas relied upon the builder 
who would be completing the home to confirm its condition. (Conclusions #37). There is no 
clear and convincing evidence to support this conclusion. 
Caravellas claim that the district court erred because it found that Horn was merely 
incompetent rather than intentionally deceiving Caravellas. (Appellants' brief, p. 22). However, 
Caravellas' entire argument is that Horn was incompetent, and that he knew he was incompetent, 
or was ignorant of his incompetence. (ld., pp. 21-24). Caravellas claim, "It is obvious from the 
nearly innumerable construction defects later found in the Home that Horn knew almost nothing 
about the workmanship, condition or quality of the construction. (ld., p. 21) 
Caravellas were not relying on the builder who was going to complete the house for such 
representations, because Caravella had not decided to hire Horn at this time. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
97, p. 71, II. 15-18; p. 72, II. 18-20) ("[W]e had not decided that we were going to have Mr. Horn 
build it;" "[W]e did not tell him to do anything at that visit because I had not decided I was going 
to hire him yet.") 
First, these statements were not representations of fact or material. These were Horn's 
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opinions on the project. He believed that the construction, at that point, was "in good shape," 
"structurally sound" and a "great house." The construction had stopped abruptly due to 
foreclosure and an assessment of where each stage and/or project of construction was at the time 
of stoppage was not performed. It would be difficult, even for a very experienced builder, to 
assess exactly where the project had stopped and what remained for every single part of 
construction on a 6,700 square foot house with 1,525 square foot attached garage after this lapse 
of time. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6). Each of the alleged defects that Caravellas claim as evidence of 
that the condition, quality, and workmanship had been fraudulently represented would have been 
found by the building code inspector and corrected by Horn prior to completion of the project, 
just as they were found by Jared Kay, the person Carvellas later hired to inspect and complete the 
project. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, p. 2). 
A representation which is expressed and understood as nothing more than a statement of 
opinion cannot constitute fraud, and this is especially true where the opinion expressed is 
honestly entertained. Smith v. Johnson, 47 Idaho 468, 276 P. 320, 321 (1929). To be actionable, 
a false representation must be one of fact as distinguished from an expression of opinion which 
ordinarily is not presumed to deceive or mislead, or to influence the judgment of the hearer, and 
upon which he has no right to rely. Id. See also Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 
60 I, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006) (Opinions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do 
not speak to matters of fact. An exception to the general rule exists where a false prediction or 
opinion is given with the intent to mislead.) 
The district court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Horn did not know 
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that these representations were false. (Conclusions #43). Further, the district court concluded 
that there is no evidence in the record that Horn was actually aware of the poor workmanship on 
the framing, flashing and other places in the home. (Conclusions #44). Caravellas successfully 
painted Horn as one who was not a "hands-on" general contractorlbuilder. (ld.) 
Caravellas have not shown, through clear and convincing evidence, that the district court 
erred in concluding that Horn did not know these representations were false. They have not 
shown that Horn had knowledge and intent to deceive regarding his representations that the 
house was "in good shape," "structurally sound" and a "great house." 
Consistently, there is no clear and convincing evidence that these representations were 
intended to be relied on, that Caravellas justifiably relied on them, or that there was any injury 
from the representations for the same reasons as stated above regarding the representations of 
value. In fact, the district court, using the lower preponderance of the evidence standard, 
concluded that sophisticated purchasers like the Caravellas would not likely have reJied solely on 
statements regarding Horn's building skills, reputation, and self-promotion.6 (Conclusion #44). 
b. Horn's Statements regarding the Progress and Quality of the Work 
performed pursuant t.o the Contract with the Caravellas were not 
fraudulent. 
Caravellas claim that the district court expressly found that Horn (FDG) represented to 
6 Self-promotion is not actionahle representations. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe. Inc. v. N. Califorllia Collection Servo 
Inc .• 911 F.2d 242. 246 (9th Cir. 1990) (The common theme that seems to run through cases considering puffery in a 
variety of contexts is that consumer reliance will he induced hy specific rather than general assertions. Advertising 
which merely states in general terms that one product is superior is not actionahle); Stearns V. Select Comfort Retail 
Corp .. 08-2746 JF, 2009 WL 1635931 (N.D. Cal. June 5. 2(09) (Unverifiahle or generalized statements are not 
actionahle, for as with claims of intentional misrepresentation. such statements are not actionahle hecause no 
reasonahle consumer relies on puffery); See also Anunziato v. eMachines, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1140 (CD. 
Cal. 20(5) (Assertion of "quality." "reliahility," and "performance" are mere puffery and not actionable.) 
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the Caravellas that major, critical portions of the work had been completed according to the plans 
when, in fact, such work was neither completed nor did it conform to the plans. (Appellants' 
brief, p. 25). There is no clear and convincing evidence that Horn intentionally misrepresented 
the progress and quality of work performed pursuant to the parties' agreement. 
Caravellas have accused Horn of knowingly presenting fraudulent representations, when 
the evidence demonstrates that there was a major communication problem regarding the 
construction project from the beginning of the process, and there was never a meeting of the 
minds as to the tasks at hand. (See Defendants' Exhibit L: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 72, 84). This was 
the fault of both parties. After continual miscommunication between the parties on construction 
issues, Horn gave Dr. Caravella the option of performing work by written contract. (Defendants' 
Exhibit HH). Caravella declined, acknowledging the difficulty with communicating solely 
through email. (Id.) 
The district court concluded that there was no evidence that Horn was actually aware of 
the alleged defects in workmanship on the framing, flashing and other places in the home. 
(Conclusions #44). The district court found that Horn had represented that the exterior 
stonework had been completed. (Findings #66). FDG had completed the stonework according 
to the changes that Myers had made to the plans. (Findings #67). FDG also completed the 
flashing and ridge vents although, once leaks were discovered, additional flashing was needed in 
a few areas. (Findings #71). FDG also completed the siding on the project although, again, it 
was completed according to the changes that Myers had made to the plans (which Dr. Caravella 
did not agree with). This miscommunication caused the district court to find the siding was not 
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completed according to the plans. (Findings #73). 
The district court found that FDG billed Caravellas for installed garage and barn doors, 
but the barn doors had not been installed. (Findings #82). This was not entirely disputed by 
Horn. All three garage doors had been installed. The barn doors were in the process of being 
installed by Yellowstone and it had been represented to Horn that the installation had been 
complete. Horn relayed the same to Dr. Caravella in an email, but later found that Yellowstone 
was waiting to have some trim finished around the doors before installation. Once Dr. Caravella 
refused to pay the delinquent Yellowstone invoice, the Yellowstone crew did not finish the 
installation of the barn doors. 
Horn described the work being done to Caravellas in a manner consistent with what the 
parties had done in the past, by emaiL This may have led to a breakdown in communication for 
this significant construction project. Horn believed that the goal was to have the entire exterior 
finished before the next snow fall. (Defendant Exhibit L). Caravellas claim that FDG was 
supposed to complete phase one of the project for $50,000, which included shoring up the 
structural framing, finishing the ridge vents, and finishing the stonework. (Tr. Vol!, p. 123, 11. 
19-25). The district court, however, concluded that Caravellas originally agreed to have FDG 
perform that work and other additional tasks for a total contract price of $88,500. The district 
court further found that due to Dr. Caravella continually adding to and/or adjusting the 
authorized work by email, he had increased the contract price to $124,646.79. (Findings #64, 
131 ). 
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c. The Billing for the Work performed on the Caravella's property was 
not fraudulent. 
The district court concluded that Yellowstone misrepresented the amount and value of 
materials used in the construction of the home, although it did not find such misrepresentation as 
intentional. (Conclusions #44). It further found that it was just as likely that Horn's 
inexperience as a general contractorlbuilder was the chief reason for the poor management of 
materials on the project and that Yellowstone's failure to clearly account for the materials 
actually supplied and used on the Caravella project was concerning. (Conclusions #47). 
The district court had 110 evidence to conclude that FDG/Horn fraudulently overbilled 
Caravellas, because FDG was not the entity determining the amount of materials needed for each 
project nor was FDG the entity creating the invoices for the materials. FDG was receiving 
invoices from Yellowstone, and then forwarding these on to Dr. Caravella. (See Defendants' 
Exhibits XXX, YYY). Yellowstone would determine the amount of materials needed to 
complete a job, order the materials, and then send an invoice to FDG. FDG was not a part of this 
process other than forwarding the invoice and billing Caravellas for the materials and labor. 
The district court's Findings # 113-123 are in regard to the overbilling for materials. Each 
of these findings indicates that the billing originated from Yellowstone Lumber to FDG or to 
FDG and the Caravellas. There is no evidence on record that FDG manipulated the billing in 
order to increase its own profits. 
Caravellas do not dispute the above findings and conclusions but instead claim that Horn 
should have known he was overcharging based upon an alleged agreed upon price of $88,500, 
but the Caravellas were billed, and paid, $138,097.24. (Appellants' brief, p. 27.) Caravellas, 
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however, admit that FDG was actually owed at least $126,646.79 for the work performed. (ld.) 
These statements are based on the district courts' finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the parties had a contract for $88,500. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence 
that a contract was formed for this amount. 
The evidence proves that the agreement was actually a cost plus contract wherein the 
immediate goal was to finish the entire exterior before the next snow fall. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16; 
Defendants' Exhibit L). On May 13, Dr. Caravella informed Horn, "However you want to phase 
the project is fine with me. I would just like to have the entire exterior finished before the next 
snowfall." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit , Defendants' Exhibit L). 
On May 16, Dr. Caravella asked Horn to estimate what certain projects would cost 
including the rough in electric; the installation of the HV AC duct work; insulation; and the roof 
and ridges. (Id.) Horn emailed Dr. Caravella back, stating, "I will round off the numbers for you 
but in general this is what you're looking at in our desired order of accomplishment. .. " Horn set 
forth the following: 
$50k for exterior stone, framing materials and labor; 
$70k for plumbing, electrical rough, and HV AC; 
$35k for exterior wrap, siding, pre-stain; 
$15k for insulation; 
$45k for drywall. 
(!d.) He stated that it would cost Caravellas approximately $150k-$200k to seal up the house 
and complete the rough in mechanicals before winter. (Id.) 
At trial, Dr. Caravella admitted that the general estimates given by Horn were not actual 
bids but that Horn was supposed to provide him with some updated worksheets with firm 
26 
estimates in the following weeks. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 124, Ii. 10-20). Dr. Caravella stated that since 
FDG was not supposed to start any work until he had a bid price and these were the only 
estimates he received, he assumed that these were the actual bid prices. (ld.) 
The evidence in the record shows that there was never a meeting of the minds as to a 
contract for work in the amount of $88,500.7 The goal of phase one was to have the entire 
exterior finished before the next snowfall and Horn informed Dr. Caravella it would cost 
approximately $150k-$200k. Further, the general estimates for the work mentioned above did 
not include everything that would be necessary to finish the entire exterior. There was a 
misunderstanding as to the work to be performed and there is absolutely no evidence that proves 
Horn knew Caravellas were being overcharged. 
Caravellas also cites to Parker v. Herron, 30 Idaho 327, 164 P. 1013 (1917) an Idaho 
case from 19 [7 for an assertion that, "Circumstances inconsistent with an honest, reasonable 
belief in the truth of the statements, or indicating a reckless disregard/or the truth" are sufficient 
to establish the scienter element of fraud. However, this is not the law in Idaho. It is clear that 
for a finding of fraud a person must establish nine elements, one heing "the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity." Glaze v. Dejj'enbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 833. Modern Idaho case law does not 
include recklessness as an element of fraud. 
Caravellas also claim that Horn's prior conduct with Myers and First Horizon is evidence 
of motive and intent because the district court found a "pattern of billing for materials that were 
7 The '"meeting of the minds" must occur on all material terms to the contract. Barry Ii. Pac. W. Cunst .. Inc., 140 
Idaho 827, 831-32, 103 P.3d 440, 444-45 (2004). 
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never used in constructing the home." (Findings #137). However, neither Myers, First Horizon, 
nor the district court in this case accused or found that Horn had done anything improper in 
regard to his dealings with Myers or First Horizon. It is unknown what happened to any 
materials that were left on the property during the 14 months from when construction stopped 
and resumed on the property and there is absolutely no evidence that Horn was responsible for 
any materials not accounted for during this time. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MIKE HORN WAS 
NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE AS AN AGENT FOR FDG. 
Caravellas claim that Horn entered into the contract with them as an agent for an 
undisclosed principal. (Appellants' brief, p. 28). Their entire argument on this issue is that the 
principal, Frontier Development Group, LLC dba Open Range Homes was never disclosed to 
Caravellas prior to the time the contract was entered into. (ld. 28-36). 
The district court concluded that there was no evidence in the record that Horn attempted 
to conceal the LLC from Caravellas. (Conclusions #59). There is substantial and competent 
evidence to support this conclusion. In an email communication with Greise and Caravella, 
Horn disclosed that the construction work is done by Open Range Homes. He stated: 
I operate on a cost plus contract of 15% and I don not build on a 
fixed price. Once the owner is firm on hiring Open Range, I 
require a $25K deposit which is held in my account until the final 
draw. At the time of the final draw, all final bills are paid off 
including any due contract fee and any remainder paid back to the 
Owner. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). Consistently, all of the email communications from Horn, prior to and 
after any agreement, were from his address, builder@openrangehomes.com, and there was 
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signage for Open Range Homes at the Project site from the time the Myers project began until 
FDG stopped construction on the Project which the district court found that Caravellas should 
have seen. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 235-237; Findings #163). This signage was in place when Caravellas 
visited the project prior to their purchase of the property. Frontier Development Group, LLC 
was registered to do business in Idaho, and had declared a dba for Open Range Homes. It was a 
registered contractor in Idaho. (Findings #155). 
Further, the district court found it important that Dr. Caravella was a sophisticated buyer. 
(ld.) The district court found that Dr. Caravella must have known he was dealing with FDG 
because all of the bills paid by Caravellas were made payable to Frontier Development Group, 
LLC or Open Range Homes (Defendants' Exhibits #Q, BB, NN, UU). Supporting this finding is 
the absence in the record of any communication from Dr. Caravella inquiring as to who the 
checks should be made out to indicating that he was already aware of the entity. Also, the 
invoices were sent on FDG letterhead (Defendants' Exhibits #V, W). There is substantial 
evidence in the record which supports the district court's finding that Caravellas were on notice 
they were dealing with a business entity. (ld.) 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT FDG WAS NOT AN 
"ALTER EGO" OF MIKE HORN. 
The district court concluded that, although Horn was not overly attentive to the 
formalities of entity ownership, Caravellas failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there was a complete unity of interest and ownership. (Conclusions #59). There is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the district court's findings. 
The district court found that Horn created FDG for the purpose of operating a business as 
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a building contractor and registered the assumed business name of Open Range Homes for FDG 
with the Idaho Secretary of State. (Findings # 155; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 90). It further found that 
FDG owned construction related assets including two telescopic forklifts. (Findings #157; See 
Tr. Vol II, p. 910, 11. 24 - p. 211, 1. 10). There is no evidence that Horn and FDG comingled 
funds; Horn testified that he did not receive a salary or take away draws until a project was 
complete. (Tr. Vol II, p. 910, II. 12-23). In other words, he did not pay himself or pay personal 
debts with FDG's funds. 
As stated above, Horn disclosed his LLC to Caravella pnor to entering into any 
agreements with Caravella (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16), all of the email communications from Horn, 
prior to and after any agreement were from his work email address, 
builder@openrangehomes.com, and there was signage for Open Range Homes at the Project site 
from the time the Myers project began until FDG stopped construction on the Project (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 235-237). 
Caravellas argue that the only facts relied on by the district court in support of its 
conclusion that Horn should not be held personally liable were Horn's unsupported testimony. 
However, this is the only evidence on record, and therefore, the only evidence that the district 
court could have relied on. 
Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy to be exercised with caution. Jordan, 
124 Idaho 899, 905, 865 P.2d 990, 996. The Court should not disregard the separate identity of 
the corporation unless doing so is necessary to avoid unjust consequences inconsistent with the 
corporate concept. Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Corp., 130 Idaho 310, 315, 647 P.2d 
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766, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). This view is shared and supported by numerous other jurisdictions as 
well. See State ex rei. v. Superior National Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 103, 1040 (Ore. 2006) (Piercing 
the corporate veil is an extraordinary remedy which exists as a last resort.) 
To warrant casting aside the legal fiction of distinct corporate existence it must be shown 
that there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality of such corporation and 
such person has ceased; and it must further appear from the facts that the observance of the 
fiction of separate existence would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 14] Idaho 604, 613, 114 P.3d 974,983 (2005). Both 
elements of the two-prong test must be satisfied in order for the court to proceed with piercing 
the corporate veil. Davidson v. Beco COlp., 122 Idaho 560, 569-70, 733 P.2d 781, 789-90 (CL 
App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 768 P.2d 792 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Therefore, even when the plaintiff can clear the high hurdle of demonstrating a 
clear unity of interest between the individual and the corporation, the plaintiff must also 
demonstrate that a fraud or injustice would occur should the corporate shield remain intact. Id. 
An LLC is specifically relieved of the requirement of observing any particular formalities 
relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its activities. I.e. §30-6-304. In the 
comments to this section, it states that "In the realm of LLC's this factor is inappropriate, 
because informality of organization and operation is both common and desired." Caravellas 
point to the example set forth in this section: 
EXAMPLE: The sole owner of a limited liability company uses a 
car titled in the company's name for personal purposes and writes 
checks on the company's account to pay for personal expenses. 
These facts are relevant to a piercing claim; they pertain to 
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economic separateness ... 
There is no evidence that Horn used a vehicle titled in FDG's name for personal purposes 
or that he wrote checks on FDG's account to pay for personal expenses. Nor is there evidence 
that any funds were comingled. See Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 556-57, 
165 P.3d 261,270-71 (2007) (the LLC's checking account was so confusing that the accountant 
could not be sure whose money was in the account at what times.) The evidence proves that 
FDG's funds were kept separate and that Horn only took the funds out of the LLC once a project 
was complete. Their personalities and economic separateness were maintained. 
Caravellas also claim that under-capitalization is another influencing factor in the 
"piercing" analysis. (Appellants' brief, p. 40). It has been held that undercapitalization is one 
factor to be considered in determining whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. Pierson v. 
Jones, 102 Idaho 82, 84, 625 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1981). However, financial inadequacy is 
measured by the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking or the reasonableness of the 
cushion for creditors at the time of the inception of the corporation. 
This factor has not been and should not be used as part of the anal ysis in Idaho of 
whether to pierce the veil of an LLC. The LLC at issue, FDG, was created for the purpose of 
operating as a building contractor. FDG was operated by the managing partner who hired out all 
of the hands-on work to subcontractors and had built three homes prior to working on 
Myers/Caravellas project. The nature of this LLC was very focused and it was not possible, nor 
necessary to have substantial capital invested into such an operation. Prior to its dealing with 
Caravellas this LLC had only been in operation for approximately two years. (Findings #3). 
32 
Regardless, there is no evidence that the LLC was undercapitalized, because there is no 
evidence of the extent of capitalization of the LLC at its inception. Horn testified that FDG 
owned two forklifts, but the value and date of purchase of such forklifts is not on record. There 
is no basis for a finding that the LLC was undercapitalized for its size and function. 
Caravellas also claim that an inequitable result, which would "sanction a fraud or 
promote injustice," will follow if Horn is allowed to engage in such damaging behavior and be 
allowed to hide behind such a thin corporate veil. (Appellants' brief, p. 41) The district court 
did not find that an inequitable result has occurred; it found that "there were inequitable 
concerns." (Conclusions #60). There were no findings by the district court that there were any 
serious inequitable results. It is not a proper basis to pierce the corporate veil where there exists 
a risk that the corporation may file for bankruptcy or become insolvent, even when such action 
impairs a plaintiffs ability to recover damages. MorRwl v. Burks, 93 Wash.2d 580, 583, 611 P.2d 
751,760 (1980); Jackson v. Odell, 851 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. 1993). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
FDG/Horn respectfully request the Court affirm the district court's decision, finding that 
they were not liable for fraud to Caravellas. FDG/Horn further request that Court affirm the 
district court's determination that Horn is not personally liable under theories of undisclosed 
agency or alter ego. FDG/Horn also request an award of their attorneys fees and costs incurred 
on appeal. 
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DATED of July, 2013. 
MOORE & ELlA, LLP 
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